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EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL AND WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE IN OKLAHOMA
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, a terminated employee did not have a cause of
action for wrongful discharge, because the American principle of em-
ployment-at-will was generally accepted without question. Under this
principle, either party to an employment contract of indefinite duration
could terminate that contract at any time for any reason, or for no rea-
son. Recently, however, judicial decisions and legislative enactments
have eroded the employment-at-will doctrine; this erosion has led to con-
fusion and increased litigation regarding wrongful discharge. Since 1980,
courts in almost every state have faced wrongful discharge questions,'
and approximately thirty jurisdictions now recognize a cause of action
for wrongful discharge.2 In the words of one commentator, it is "the
labor law issue of the 80s." 3
Labor law is changing in Oklahoma, as well. Recent cases have left
the wrongful discharge causes of action in a state of confusion.4 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized that this area of the law must
be clarified and has begun to construct a framework for the analysis of
employment-at-will and wrongful discharge in Oklahoma.
1. Springer, The Wrongful Discharge Case: Establishing and Avoiding Employer Liability,
TRIAL, June 1985, at 38 (citing Employment-at-Will Subcommittee, Employment and Labor Rela-
tions Law Committee, ABA Litigation Section, 1984 Report (Aug. 4, 1984)).
2. Tepker, Oklahoma's At-Will Rule: Heeding The Warnings of America's Evolving Employ-
ment Law?, 39 OKLA. L. REv. 373, 378 (1986) (citing Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 147
Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985)).
3. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial Assessment of the La-
bor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAW. 1 (1984). The recent proliferation of commentary on the
subject underscores the importance of this labor issue. See Burton, Breach of Contract and the
Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369 (1980); Decker, Handbooks
and Employment Policies as Express or Implied Guarantees of Employment-Employer Bewarel, 5 J.
L. & CoM. 207 (1985); Driscoll, Employment-At-Will: A Practical Guide for Employers, WOMEN
LAW. J., Summer 1983, at 7; Gilberg and Voluck, Employee Termination Without Litigation, PER-
SONNEL, May 1987, at 17; McCoy, A Primer on the Oklahoma Retaliatory Discharge Act, 57 OKLA.
B.J. 715 (1986); Springer, supra note 1; Tepker, supra note 2; Note, Protecting At Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816
(1980); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335 (1974).
4. Grayson v. American Airlines, Inc., 803 F.2d 1097 (10th Cir. 1986); Hinson v. Cameron,
742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987); Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
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II. NATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
A. Evolution of the Employment-at- Will Doctrine
The principle of employment-at-will did not exist at English com-
mon law.' As early as the sixteenth century, English and American
courts presumed that a general hiring for an indefinite period was a re-
newable contract for employment for one year,6 and the employer could
be liable if he discharged the employee without "reasonable cause" at any
time other than the end of that year.7 This approach reflected the social
structure of the times: the master-servant relationship was personal,
with almost familial obligations.'
American courts followed the English approach until the late nine-
teenth century. During the Industrial Revolution, the personal master-
servant relationship evolved into the more impersonal employer-
employee relationship.9 Influenced by the writings of Horace G.
Wood,10 American courts in almost every state reversed precedent and
gradually accepted the employment-at-will principle."1
Courts used several theories and policies to justify this departure
from the precedent of annually renewable employment contracts.' 2
Courts applied the contract law rationale of "mutuality of obligation" as
applied to an employment relationship.13 In other cases they focused on
5. For a comprehensive overview of the evolution of the employment-at-will doctrine and its
foundations, see Tepker, supra note 2, at 378-92.
6. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, -, 710 P.2d 1025, 1030 (1985)
(citing Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L.
REV. 329, 332 (1982)).
7. Id.
If the hiring be general, without any particular time limited [sic], the law construes it to be
a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall serve, and the
master shall maintain him, throughout the revolutions of the respective seasons, as well as
when there is work to be done as when there is not.
Tepker, supra note 2, at 379 (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425).
8. Tepker, supra note 2, at 379. See also Feinman, The Development of the Employment at
Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 118 (1976).
9. Tepker, supra note 2, at 379-80.
10. H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 271 (1877). "With us the rule is inflexible,
that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it
out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof." Id. at 272. Critics note that
none of the four cases which Wood cited actually support the rule of employment at will. Lopatka,
supra note 3, at 4 (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 602 & nn.13-14, 292
N.W.2d 880, 886-87 & nn.13-14 (1980)).
11. Tepker, supra note 2, at 380.
12. Id.
13. "[A]n employee's freedom to quit his job at any time and for any or no reason supported
the employer's corresponding freedom to terminate the employee at any time and for any or no
reason." Brief of Anicus Curiae, American Airlines, Inc. at 3, Burk v. K-Mart Corp., No. 67,785
(submitted to the Oklahoma Supreme Court) [hereinafter American Airlines Brief] (citing Freeman
2
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the parties' "probable expectations."14 In addition, judges preferred to
defer to the reasonableness of an employer's discretion and sound busi-
ness judgment, because the employer could more competently assess the
productivity of its personnel. 15 Once courts accepted the doctrine of
employment-at-will, they adhered strictly to the presumption that an em-
ployment contract was at-will: 16 unless parties agreed otherwise, an em-
ployment contract of indefinite duration could be terminated by either
party at any time for any reason. 17
B. Exceptions to Employment-at- Will
The at-will presumption has steadily declined in most states.18 To-
day, most jurisdictions have abandoned the rigid employment-at-will rule
and recognize some form of wrongful discharge.1 9 Courts have eroded
the at-will doctrine by carving out three general exceptions: public
policy, breach of implied contract, and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.2"
1. Public Policy
An employer may be held liable for wrongfully terminating an em-
ployee if the discharge violates public policy.21 Cases in which the dis-
charge violates public policy fall into three major categories, with a
fourth catch-all category: (1) discharge for refusing to commit an illegal
v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 239 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Okla. 1965)). This turn-of-the-
century doctrine has gradually eroded, and if the requirement of consideration is met, there is no
additional requirement of mutuality of obligation. American Airlines Brief at 3 (quoting REsrATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981)). See also Tepker, supra note 2, at 387-92.
14. See Tepker, supra note 2, at 382-85. "The at-will contract... allows both sides to take a
wait-and-see attitude to their relationship so that new and more accurate choices can be made on the
strength of improved information .... Id. at 384 (quoting Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 969 (1984)).
15. Id. at 385-87. See also Carley, At-Will Employees Still Vulnerable, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1987, at
66, 70.
16. Gilberg and Voluck, supra note 3, at 17.
17. Id.
18. See Lopatka, supra note 3, at 1-6.
19. Id. at 1.
20. Oklahoma courts have been reluctant to adopt all of the exceptions to the employment-at-
will doctrine, but the Oklahoma legislature has imposed certain limited public policy exceptions. See
infra note 21.
21. That which violates "public policy" varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from
case to case. In Oklahoma, for example, an employer may not discharge an employee for being
absent due to jury service, OKLA. STAT. tit. 38, §§ 34, 35 (1981 & Supp. 1987); for filing a worker's
compensation claim, OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 5 (1981); or for opposing discriminatory practices,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1601 (1981).
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act;2 2 (2) discharge for exercising a legal right or privilege;23 (3) dis-
charge for performing a public obligation;24 and (4) discharge for motives
which violate other "clear mandates" of public policy. 25 The public pol-
icy exception is the most widely received exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine;26 in some jurisdictions, it is the sole exception.27
2. Implied Contract
Several courts have found an implied-in-fact agreement or contract
not to discharge an employee except for "just cause."28 Certain em-
ployer representations may form an implied contractual basis for chang-
ing an at-will agreement into an agreement to terminate only for just
22. See McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (refusal to violate antitrust
laws); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980)
(refusal to participate in price-fixing); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 174
Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (employee refused to perjure himself); Trombetta v. Detroit,
T. & I. R.Rt, 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978) (refusal to alter pollution reports);
O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978) (refusal to perform unlawful medical
procedure); Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l Inc., 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984) (refusal to sign false,
tortious statement); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (rex. 1985) (refusal to ille-
gally pump bilges into the water).
23. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (filing worker's com-
pensation claim); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (filing
worker's compensation claim); Firestone Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Meadows,
666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983) (filing worker's compensation claim); Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827,
400 P.2d 72 (1965) (joining labor union). This exception may also be expanding to create employer
liability based on the employee's constitutional rights. Lopatka, supra note 3, at 11-13 (discussing
Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983)).
24. See Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983) (employee sub-
poenaed to testify); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980)
(employee insisted employer comply with state food labeling law); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183
N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (1982) (employee adhered to state pharmacy regulations and profes-
sional ethics); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (employee absence due to jury duty).
This exception includes "whistleblowing" (complaining of or reporting employer's or another em-
ployee's wrongdoing). The discharge is generally retaliatory in nature. See Petrik v. Monarch Print-
ing Corp., 111 Ill. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982) (complained about embezzlement of
corporate funds), aff'd, 143 Ill. App. 3d 1, 493 N.E.2d 616 (1986); Palmateer v. International Har-
vester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (supplied information to authorities regarding co-
worker's illegal activity); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) (com-
plained because employer failed to comply with state and federal law).
25. See Tepker, supra note 2, at 397 nn.165-66 and accompanying text.
26. Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Excep-
tion, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1931, 1936 (1983).
27. See id. For a contrary view, see Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d
293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (a change in the established at-will doctrine should be
made by the legislature and not the courts).
28. See, eg., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
For a comprehensive discussion of the breach of implied contract exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine, see Lopatka, supra note 3, at 17-22; Decker, supra note 3.
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cause.2 9 A contract may be inferred from any communication by the
employer that could lead the employee to develop a reasonable expecta-
tion that a discharge must be only for "good cause."3 For example,
courts have given contractual status to oral employer assurances of job
security at the time of hiring.31 Courts have also treated policy state-
ments in a personnel manual as an agreement that an employee could
only be discharged for just cause.32 As these examples indicate, an im-
plied contract to terminate for good cause is based in fact, and there must
be a factual basis for the employee's belief that such an agreement exists.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing
Generally, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing33 is a duty im-
posed by law that neither party to a contract will do anything to inhibit
the other from receiving the benefits of the agreement.34 In the past,
courts used this implied covenant primarily in insurance cases, 35 but it
has been applied recently in the employment context, as well.36 In a
1980 California decision, an employee's length of service gave rise to an
obligation of the employer to terminate the employee only for "good
cause." 37 In Montana, an employee handbook bound the employer to
the handbook policies "as a matter of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing."' 38 The more accepted interpretation is the Massachusetts view:
if an employer terminates an at-will employee for the purpose of or with
the effect of depriving the employee of previously earned compensation,
29. "Just cause" or "good cause" are terms that seem to defy definition; they may mean docu-
mented unsatisfactory performance or misconduct, lack of work, or anything other than a "bad" or
"unjust" cause.
30. Springer, supra note 1, at 41-42.
31. Lopatka, supra note 3, at 19 (citing Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc.,
663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983)).
32. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 598-99, 292 N.W.2d 880, 884-85
(1980).
33. For an overview of the breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine, see Lopatka, supra note 3, at 23-26; Tepker, supra note 2, at 392-95.
34. Lopatka, supra note 3, at 23 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981)).
35. Lopatka, supra note 3, at 23.
36. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985); Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408
Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
37. Lopatka, supra note 3, at 24 (citing Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d
443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980)).
38. Id. (citing Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Mont. 1982)). The hand-
book was distributed two years after hiring and was not part of an employment contract. Id.
1988]
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the employer has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.39
This exception to the employment-at-will doctrine has enjoyed less ac-
ceptance than the other two exceptions, possibly because of the difficulty
of defining the covenant.'
III. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL IN OKLAHOMA
Oklahoma has recognized the employment-at-will doctrine for many
years: an employment contract of indefinite duration may be terminated
at any time for any reason or for no reason." This is still the general rule
today. 2 Thus, both the employer and the employee have the right to
terminate the at-will relationship without liability. 3 Recent cases, how-
ever, illustrate the debate over the continuing viability of the doctrine.'
These decisions have created considerable confusion and controversy
with respect to employment law in Oklahoma.
A. Hall v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
In Hall v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,45 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court deviated from a rigid employment-at-will approach. The plaintiff,
Ned Hall, was an at-will insurance agent for Farmers Insurance Group.46
Both parties enjoyed a mutually profitable and satisfactory relationship
for many years. 7 However, in 1978, Hall and the Farmers district man-
ager had several disagreements which eventually resulted in the termina-
tion of Hall's agency arrangement. At the time of the notice of
39. Id. at 23 (citing Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d
351 (1982); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Gram v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21 (Mass. 1981)).
40. Although Oklahoma recognizes the Restatement view that a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is implicit in every contract, past courts have declined to impose a broad legal duty upon the
employer not to terminate an at-will employee in "bad faith." E.g., Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d
549, 554 (Okla. 1987). See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
41. See Singh v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 554 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1976); Foster v. Atlas Life Ins. Co.,
154 Okla. 30, 6 P.2d 805 (1931); Rogers v. White Sewing Mach. Co., 59 Okla. 40, 157 P. 1044
(1916); Arkansas Valley Town & Land Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 49 Okla. 282, 151 P. 1028
(1915); Wilock v. Downtown Airpark, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Okla. 1955).
42. Pierce v. Franklin Elec. Co., 737 P.2d 921, 923 n.4 (Okla. 1987).
43. Freeman v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 239 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Okla. 1965). The
court in Freeman discussed the principle of mutuality of obligation as a basis for employment-at-will.
Id. at 662. See Sooner Broadcasting Co. v. Grotkop, 280 P.2d 457 (Okla. 1955).
44. Grayson v. American Airlines, Inc., 803 F.2d 1097 (10th Cir. 1986); Hinson v. Cameron,
742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987); Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
45. 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
46. Id. at 1028.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1028-29. These disagreements primarily concerned methods of sales and the termina-
tion of another agent. Id.
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termination, Farmers attempted to pay Hall $38,000 for the contract
value of his agency.49 Hall refused the offer, claiming that he was wrong-
fully terminated and that he was entitled to future income of over
$305,000 from renewal premiums.5 0 The trial court rendered a verdict in
Hall's favor and the court of appeals reversed." The Oklahoma Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the trial
court's decision regarding the wrongful discharge.52
The main issue in Hall was whether a party to a terminable-at-will
contract may be held liable for damages if the employer terminates the
contract in "bad faith."53 The court stated that every contract contains
implied covenants that neither party will do anything to injure the other
party's rights to enjoy the benefits of the contract. 4 The court extended
this implied covenant of good faith to "a covenant not to wrongfully
resort to the termination-at-will clause." 5 Because Farmers terminated
Hall with an intent to wrongfully deprive him of his earned commission,
Farmers breached the implied covenant of good faith.5 6
The Hall decision sparked controversy because it is unclear whether
the Oklahoma Supreme Court intended to overrule precedent which
found no employer liability in termination of at-will employees.5 7 One
view is that Hall signified the end of the employment-at-will rule in
Oklahoma: 8 the Oklahoma Supreme Court meant Hall to "sound the
death knell on the laissez-faire era of unbridled employer discretion."
51 9
The opposite view limits Hall exclusively to cases in which an employee
seeks to recover future compensation for past services: Hall does not
apply to an employee who seeks compensation for .future services. The
49. Id. at 1029.
50. Id.
51. Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 55 OKLA. B.J. 1297 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
52. Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 713 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Okla. 1985).
53. Id. at 1029.
54. Id. (quoting Wright v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 176 Okla. 274, 277, 54 P.2d 1084, 1087
(1935)).
55. Id. at 1030 (citing Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974)). The
Monge rationale has since been rejected in New Hampshire. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp.,
147 Ariz. 370, -, 710 P.2d 1025, 1032 n.3 (1985).
56. Hall, 713 P.2d at 1030-31. Relying upon the law of agency, the court stated that the appli-
cable rule prevents a principal from wrongfully resorting to a termination-at-will clause in the em-
ployment contract in order to deprive the agent of the fruits of the agent's labor. Id.
57. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
58. E.g., Grayson v. American Airlines, Inc., 803 F.2d 1097, 1099 (10th Cir. 1986); Hinson v.
Cameron, 57 OKLA. B.J. 1229 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986).
59. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Oklahoma State Lodge Fraternal Order of Police, Professional Fire
Fighters of Oklahoma, Burk v. K-Mart Corp., No. 67,785 (submitted to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court).
1988]
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latter view is clearly the correct position in Oklahoma today.60
Hall also left open the question whether in Oklahoma breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounds in tort or con-
tract.61 The plaintiff in Hall requested damages based solely upon future
premiums from policies already sold.62 The court awarded the damages
that Hall requested,6 3 but the decision did not address whether other
remedies, such as punitive damages, might be available to the wrongfully
discharged plaintiff.
B. Grayson v. American Airlines
One year after the Hall decision, the Tenth Circuit incorrectly inter-
preted Hall in another at-will case, Grayson v. American Airlines.64
Keith Grayson worked for American in Tulsa, Oklahoma.65 When he
was hired, Grayson signed an employment application 66 which stated
(1) that he was an at-will employee, and (2) that his employment would
be in accord with company rules and regulations.67 Approximately two
years later, American gave Grayson an employee handbook which in-
cluded a company rule that no one would be discharged without "good
cause."6 After fifteen years of employment, American notified Grayson
that his position was to be eliminated due to a reduction in force. 69
Grayson attempted to obtain another job within the company, but Amer-
ican determined that there was not another position available for which
Grayson was most qualified.70 On January 4, 1982, American termi-
nated Grayson and paid him thirty-two weeks' severance pay.71
Grayson filed suit for breach of employment contract,72 claiming
that the company rule which stated that no one would be discharged
60. The Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted this interpretation in Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d
549 (Okla. 1987).
61. This issue is significant because of the types of damages which are available under each
theory: "exemplary damages" may be awarded in a tort action, OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1981 &
Supp. 1987), but "[n]o damages can be recovered for a breach of contract, which are not clearly
ascertainable in both their nature and origin." OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 21 (1981).
62. Hall, 713 P.2d at 1031.
63. Id.
64. 803 F.2d 1097 (10th Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 1098.
66. This application contained the terms of Grayson's employment with American.
67. Grayson, 803 F.2d at 1098.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Grayson also filed suit for promissory fraud based on a prior temporary assignment to
Toronto. Id.
[Vol. 23:495
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without good cause limited American's power to terminate.7 3 The dis-
trict court granted American's motion for summary judgment.7 4 The
Tenth Circuit held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether American breached an implied covenant of good faith, and,
therefore, summary judgment was precluded.7
The Tenth Circuit in Grayson interpreted Hall as indicating that
good faith is mandated in all contracts.76 The court rejected American's
argument that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is operable
only if the employee has been denied previously earned benefits to be
paid in the future. 77 Although the plaintiff in Hall sought to recover
future commissions from renewal premiums on insurance policies al-
ready sold, the Hall court recognized that "each contract carries an im-
plicit and mutual covenant by the parties to act toward each other in
good faith."78 The Tenth Circuit apparently believed that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Hall did not intend a narrow application of the good
faith requirement,79 because the court in Hall indicated that "the implied
covenant of good faith... exists in all contracts."80 The Tenth Circuit
viewed this language as "a clear indication that the Oklahoma courts
have recognized an implied covenant of good faith in contractual deal-
ings."81 According to the Grayson court, in Oklahoma, whether or not
an employer has good cause to terminate is not dispositive of the issue;
the employer must also act in good faith.82 Although American did
show that good cause to terminate Grayson existed, such a finding did
not preclude a separate inquiry into whether American breached the cov-
enant of good faith dealing.83 The appellate court found that there was
enough information to preclude summary judgment on this issue and re-
manded the case to the district court.
84
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1099.
75. Id. at 1101. The court affirmed the summary judgment on the promissory fraud claim. Id.
at 1102.
76. Id. at 1099.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1985)).
79. Id.
80. Hall, 713 P.2d at 1031.
81. Grayson, 803 F.2d at 1099.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id. American argued on remand that Hall was limited "to principal/agent relationships
and to claims for the unconscionable denial of earned benefits." Grayson v. American Airlines, Inc.,
No. 83-C-298-C (N.D. Okla. Sept. 15, 1987) (order granting defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment). This argument was based on the Oklahoma Supreme Court's later interpretation of Hall in
Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987). See infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text. The
1988]
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C. Hinson v. Cameron
After the Tenth Circuit remanded Grayson, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court again addressed wrongful discharge in Hinson v. Cameron."5 As
illustrated by the previous cases, the law was uncertain in Oklahoma re-
garding wrongful discharge, but the Hinson opinion established a cohe-
sive framework for analyzing cases in this area.
Comanche County Hospital discharged one of its employees for fail-
ure to carry out an order.8 6 Nita Hinson worked as a nurse's assistant at
Comanche County Hospital Authority for approximately five years.8 7
The hospital discharged Hinson because she failed to follow an order on
her daily assignment sheet.88  Hinson claimed that she was not given the
order during her shift and that her supervisor, Patricia Cameron, falsely
altered the assignment sheet to show that the order was given. 9 In addi-
tion, Hinson argued that the hospital's employee manual, "which consti-
tute[d] a part of her employment contract with the Hospital, protect[ed]
federal district court relied on remand on the Oklahoma Supreme Court's narrowing of Hall in
Hinson v. Cameron. In its order granting summary judgment in favor of American, the district
court quoted "Itihe central passage in Hinson... :"
The appellate court's reversal of summary judgment against Hinson rests on Hall v. Farm-
ers Ins. Exchange. Hall came to be perceived as creating a new cause of action in favor of
an at-will employee discharged in "bad faith." As we view Hall it stands for the rule that
an agent may recover from the principal when the latter has, in bad faith, deprived him of
the fruit of his own labor. The relationship between the Hospital and Hinson as [sic] that
of master and servant, not principal and agent. Hinson is not claiming the Hospital de-
prived her of any earned income. In short, the facts and the legal relations dealt with in
Hall are clearly distinguishable from those in the present case.
Grayson v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 83-C-298-C (N.D. Okla. Sept. 15, 1987) (order granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment) (quoting Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549, 552 (Okla.
1987)). The district court distinguished Grayson from Hall by noting that Grayson was American's
employee but that Hall was Farmers' agent. In addition, the court awarded Hall earned benefits,
whereas Grayson made no claim for earned benefits. During the trial, Grayson apparently acqui-
esced in American's reasoning and focused only on the Hinson "implied employment contract"
cause of action. However, even if an implied contract to terminate only for good cause existed,
uncontroverted facts showed that American had good cause to terminate Grayson because of a
reduction in work force. Therefore, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ameri-
can. The court concluded:
[U]nder the law of the case doctrine the only issue remanded to the District Court for trial
relates to the cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing under Hall v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. With Hinson v. Cameron, that issue
has been decided in AMERICAN's favor and the case is now over.
Id. (quoting Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's July 10, 1987 Motion for Relief at 6 n.5) (emphasis
by the court).
85. 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987).
86. Id. at 551. Hinson's supervisor claimed that she left orders for Hinson to give a patient an
enema. Id. at n. 1.
87. Id. at 551.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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her from discharge absent good cause."90
Hinson brought an action for wrongful discharge from employment,
or in the alternative, for breach of employment contract.91 The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals
and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment.92
In Hinson, the Oklahoma Supreme Court first clarified its holding in
Hall.93 The court recognized that Hall had been "perceived as creating a
new cause of action in favor of an at-will employee discharged in 'bad
faith.' ,9 To correct this misperception, the court stated that Hall
"stands for the rule that an agent may recover from the principal when
the latter has, in bad faith, deprived him of the fruit of his own labor."9
Both the facts and the legal relationships in Hinson and Hall were
"clearly distinguishable." 96
The court in Hinson summarized the national body of law governing
employment-at-will and the exceptions upon which a wrongful discharge
claim may be based.97 The court discussed in detail the three separate
theories upon which exceptions are founded: (1) "public policy tort,"
(2) "tortious breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing," and (3) "implied contract that restricts the employer's power to
discharge."9 Although the court did not specifically adopt each theory,
there is a strong implication that in the future it may do so.
1. Public Policy
Because Hinson's termination did not violate public policy, the
court found no need to rule on this exception.99 In dicta, however, the
court adopted a wrongful discharge cause of action based on the public
policy exception to employment-at-will. The Court discussed the facts
surrounding Hinson's claim as if "Oklahoma would apply the public pol-
icy exception and would recognize an action for tortious discharge
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 558.
93. Id. at 552.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id. (citations omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 553. The facts surrounding Hinson's dismissal did not lead to a wrongful discharge
claim based on the public policy exception, because the hospital did not order Hinson to act illegally,
deny her any legal rights, or prevent her from performing a public obligation. Id.
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.... ,,o Even in light of the public policy exception, however, Hinson's
claim was not actionable.101
2. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
While the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hinson acknowledged that a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was implicit in every contract, it
refused to imply a duty to terminate only for good cause in an at-will
employment relationship. 10 2 The court refused "to impose upon the em-
ployer a legal duty not to terminate an at-wil employee in bad faith."'0 3
The court reasoned that its "adoption of a contrary view would 'subject
each discharge to judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of bad
faith.' "104
3. Implied Contract
The Court in Hinson recognized that particular facts may imply a
contract restricting or limiting an employer's discretion to discharge an
at-will employee. 10 5 The court named five critical factors to determine
whether such an implied-in-fact contract exists: 0 6 (1) evidence of "sepa-
rate consideration," other than the employee's continued services, to sup-
port the implied contract; (2) longevity of the employment relationship;
(3) employer handbooks and company policy manuals; (4) detrimental
reliance by the employee on oral assurances, pre-employment interviews,
company policy, or past practices; and (5) "promotions and commenda-
tions." 107 The hospital's employment manual did not contain an exclu-
sive list of all grounds for termination; therefore, it did not create an
100. Id. at 557.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 554.
103. Id. (citations omitted). Even if there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
every at-will employment relationship, "that covenant does not operate to forbid employment sever-
ence except for good cause." Id.
104. Id. (quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, _, 652 P.2d 625, 629 (1982)).
The court cited Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985), and
Tepker, supra note 2, at 442. The court's use of language from Wagenseller implied that the court
believed that such a radical departure from precedent was the province of the legislature, not the
judiciary. Hinson, 742 P.2d at 554.
105. Hinson, 742 P.2d at 554.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 554-55. (citations omitted). The court discussed a lower court decision, Langdon v.
Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976), in which a personnel manual created the contrac-
tual basis for claim to benefits, but the court in Hinson did not directly address this issue. The court
[Vol. 23:495
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implied contract limiting the hospital's authority to terminate Hinson.'0°
D. Burk v. K-Mart
In late 1986, federal district Judge Brett'0 9 certified six questions
regarding wrongful discharge to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Burk v.
K-Mart Corp. 110 The subsequent Hinson decision addressed some of
these questions, but a few of them remain unanswered.
The first question is whether in Oklahoma there is an implied obli-
gation of good faith and fair dealing in reference to termination in every
employment-at-will contract. By voicing the Restatement view that the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implicit in all contracts,
the Hinson decision and its interpretation of Hall probably answered this
certified question in the affirmative.' 1 However, this covenant is not so
extensive as to prohibit an employer from terminating an employee. In
the employment context, the Hinson decision limited breaches of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to situations in which the
employer has terminated the employee for the unconscionable purpose of
depriving an employee of future compensation earned for past serv-
ices. 112 Therefore, termination itself is not prohibited; the law merely
prohibits failure to pay earned benefits."
3
The second question is whether the implied obligation of good faith
is mutual between the employer and the employee. If there is an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts, the covenant
should apply to all parties. Both the employer and the employee have a
mutual obligation of good faith in the performance of their agreement."
4
The third question is whether the breach of this implied obligation
sounds in contract and/or in tort. Prior Oklahoma decisions have not
clearly addressed this question. The damages awarded in Hall"5 indi-
cate that such a breach may sound only in contract. On the other hand,
certain language in Hinson implies that a breach of the implied covenant
also cited an Oklahoma public employee case in which the Tenth Circuit held that a written em-
ployee handbook specifying that permanent employees would not be dismissed except for cause cre-
ated a property interest in continued employment, Vinyard v. King, 728 F.2d 428, 432 (10th Cir.
1984). Hinson, 742 P.2d at 555 (citations omitted).
108. Hinson, 742 P.2d at 555-57.
109. Hon. Thomas R. Brett, United States District Judge, Northern District of Oklahoma.
110. No. 86-C-440-B (N.D. Okla. filed Nov. 28, 1986).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 205-08 (1981).
112. Hinson, at 742 P.2d 552.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 13.
115. Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
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of good faith and fair dealing sounds in tort.1 6 However, because the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hall stated that the terminated employee
may only recover benefits previously earned, this question may now be
moot.
The fourth question addresses the recoverable damages if the breach
sounds in contract. The Hall court only awarded compensation for serv-
ices already performed." 7 Because Hall only requested compensation al-
ready earned,"' it is not clear how the court would have ruled had Hall
asked for an amount that would compensate him for the amount which
he would have earned had he not been terminated.
The fifth question addresses the character of the defendant's con-
duct that would permit recovery of punitive damages if the breach
sounds in tort. If this breach sounds in tort, Oklahoma law would permit
the recovery of punitive damages if the employer's conduct evidences a
"wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of another, oppression, fraud
or malice .... ,,119
The sixth question asks what duty either party has to mitigate dam-
ages. According to the United States Supreme Court, a dismissed em-
ployee has a duty to make a reasonable and diligent effort to find new
employment."'° The failure by the employee to attempt to reduce dam-
ages constitutes a willful loss of earnings and relieves the employer of
liability.1 21
Although Hinson provided a framework for the law of wrongful dis-
charge, many details are missing. 2 By answering the Burk questions,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court will be able to expand and clarify its hold-
ing in Hinson, as well as indicate exactly what exceptions to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine are valid in Oklahoma. In addition, the Oklahoma
court may specifically address the remedies that are available with these
exceptions.
116. Hinson, 742 P.2d at 552.
117. Hall, 713 P.2d at 1031. The services previously performed in Hall were the sales of insur-
ance policies; the compensation was for the commissions from the future premiums on those policies.
118. Id. at 1029.
119. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
120. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982) (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-98 (1941)).
121. Id.
122. A recent appellate court decision underscored the inconsistencies in Oklahoma's past
wrongful discharge decisions. On September 8, 1987 (after Hinson's and Grayson's remand), in Mc-
Gehee v. Florafax Int'l, Inc., 58 OKLA. B.J. (Okla. Ct. App. 1987), the court ignored the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's decision in Hinson and relied upon its own interpretation of Hall. The appellate
court's failure to follow an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision further frustrates attempts to find
order or predictability in Oklahoma employment law.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although employment-at-will is still the presumption in Oklahoma,
recent decisions have created uncertainty and confusion in the field of
labor law. The Oklahoma Supreme Court made a strong attempt to con-
front these problems in Hinson v. Cameron. The court in Hinson limited
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
context to narrow circumstances and laid the groundwork for analyzing
future wrongful discharge issues. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has es-
tablished a basic approach to employment-at-will issues; however, it
must continue to clarify this area of the law. The certified questions now
before the court will provide the court the opportunity to provide cer-
tainty and predictability in the area of wrongful discharge law.
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